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1
1 Introduction
Recently some results have been presented which show that certain kinds of deterministic
descriptions and indeterministic descriptions are observationally equivalent (Werndl 2009a,
Werndl 2010). These results prompt interesting philosophical questions, such as what ex-
actly these results show or whether the deterministic or indeterministic description is prefer-
able when there is observational equivalence. There is hardly any philosophical discussion
about these questions, and this paper contributes to filling this gap.
More specifically, first, I will discuss the philosophical comments made by mathemati-
cians about observational equivalence, in particular Ornstein & Weiss (1991). Their com-
ments are vague, and I will argue that, according to a reasonable interpretation, they are
misguided. Second, the results on observational equivalence raise the question of whether
the deterministic or indeterministic description is preferable relative to all evidence. If none
of them is preferable, this would amount to underdetermination. I will criticize Winnie’s
(1998) argument that, by appealing to different observations, one finds that the determi-
nistic description is preferable. In particular, I will clarify a confusion in this argument.
Furthermore, I will argue that if the concern is a strong form of underdetermination, the
argument delivers the desired conclusion but this conclusion is trivial; and for the other
kind of underdetermination of interest the argument fails.
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 I will introduce deterministic and inde-
terministic descriptions. In section 3 I will present the relevant results on observational
equivalence. These results are highly technical, and I will keep the discussion at an intuitive
level. In section 4 I will discuss the mathematicians’ claims about observational equivalence.
Section 5 will be about Winnie’s argument on the role of different observations. Finally, in
section 6 I will summarise the results.
2 Deterministic and Indeterministic Descriptions
I will introduce the relevant deterministic and indeterministic descriptions informally; for
the technical details the reader is referred to Werndl (2010). Deterministic and indeter-
ministic descriptions are of two kinds: either the time increases in discrete steps or the
time-parameter varies continually. Because the latter case is more important in the sci-
ences, this paper focuses on descriptions involving a continuous time parameter.1
Deterministic Systems
We will be concerned with measure-theoretic deterministic descriptions, in short determi-
nistic systems. A deterministic system is a triple (X,Tt, p); the set X, called the phase
space, represents all possible states of the system; Tt(x), t ∈ R, are functions, called the
1For more on descriptions where the time varies discretely see Werndl (2009a).
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Figure 1: Two hard balls in a box
evolution functions, which tell one that the system in state x evolves to Tt(x) after t time
steps; and p assigns a probability to regions of X. It is obvious that these systems are deter-
ministic according to the standard philosophical definition, namely that determinism means
that two solutions which agree at one time agree at all future times (Butterfield 2005).
A solution is a possible evolution of the system in the course of time, i.e., a function
sx(t) : R → X, sx(t) = Tt(x) for an arbitrary x ∈ X. Deterministic systems thus de-
fined are among the most important descriptions in science. For instance, all deterministic
descriptions in Newtonian and statistical mechanics are of this kind.
Example 1. Two hard balls in a box. This is a system in Newtonian mechanics where
two balls which interact by elastic collisions and which have a finite radius but no rotational
motion move in a three-dimensional box (cf. Sima´nyi 1999). Figure 1 shows the hard ball
system in a specific state. Mathematically, this system is represented as follows. X is the
set of all possible states, i.e., the set of all vectors consisting of the position and velocity
coordinates of the two balls. This means that the specific state of the system shown in
Figure 1 is represented by exactly one x ∈ X. The evolution functions tell us that the hard
ball system in state x will evolve to Tt(x) after t time steps. For an arbitrary region A in
phase space, p assigns the probability p(A) to the event that the two hard balls are in one of
the states represented by A. And a solution is a possible evolution of the hard ball system
in the course of time.
Finally, when a deterministic system in state x is observed, a value Φ(x) is observed
which is dependent on x (but may be different from it). Thus observations are modeled as
observation functions, i.e., functions Φ(x) : X → XO where XO is the set of all possible
observed values.
Stochastic Processes
The indeterministic descriptions which I will be concerned with are stochastic processes,
which are processes that are governed by probabilistic laws. A stochastic process {Zt}
consists of a family of functions Zt : Ω → E, t ∈ R. The set E, called the outcome space,
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Figure 2: A realisation of a semi-Markov process
represents all possible outcomes of the process, and Zt(ω) represents the outcome of the
process at time t. Furthermore, probability distributions P (Zt ∈ A) tells us the probability
that the outcome of the process is in A at time t for any region A of E and any t ∈ R,
and probability distributions P (Zs ∈ A given that Zt ∈ B) tell us the probability that the
process is in A at time s given that it is in B at time t for arbitrary regions A,B of E and any
t, s ∈ R. A realisation of the stochastic process is a possible evolution of the process in the
course of time, i.e., a function rω(t) : R → E, sω(t) = Zt(ω) for an arbitrary ω ∈ Ω. (Here
one sees that, intuitively, ω encodes the evolution of the stochastic process.) Stochastic
processe are usually indeterministic. If the process takes a specific outcome, there are many
outcomes that might follow, and a probability distribution measures the likelihood of them.
Stochastic processes are the main indeterministic descriptions in the sciences.
Example 2: semi-Markov processes. A semi-Markov process is a process with finitely
many possible outcomes e1, . . . , en. The process takes the outcome ei for a time ui, and
which outcome follows ei depends only on ei. Figure 2 shows a realisation of a semi-Markov
process with four possible outcomes e1, e2, e3, e4. The probability distributions of the semi-
Markov process tell us, for instance, the probability that the process takes a specific outcome
at time t, such as P (Zt = e3), or the probability that an outcome at time t is followed by
another outcome at s, such as P (Zs = e3 given that Zt = e4) for t, s ∈ R (cf. Ornstein
& Weiss 1991, Werndl 2010). Semi-Markov processes are widespread in the sciences (cf.
Janssen & Limnios 1999)
3 Observational Equivalence of Deterministic and In-
deterministic Descriptions
Observational equivalence as understood here means that the deterministic description,
when observed with an observation function, and the stochastic process give the same pre-
dictions. Let me explain what “give the same predictions” means. The predictions derived
from a stochastic process are the probability distributions over its realisations. Because there
is a probability measure p defined on a deterministic system, when applying an observation
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function, the predictions obtained are the probability distributions over the solutions of the
system coarse-grained by the observation function. Consequently, I say that a stochastic
process {Zt} and a deterministic system (X,Tt, p) observed with an observation function Φ
give the same predictions iff: (i) the outcome space E of {Zt} and the set of possible values
of Φ are identical, and (ii) the probability distributions over the solutions of the determi-
nistic system coarse-grained by Φ and the probability distributions over the realisations are
the same.
Suppose that a deterministic system (X,Tt, p) is observed with an observation function
Φ. Then {Φ(Tt)} is a stochastic process which is observationally equivalent to (X,Tt, p) as
observed with Φ. Let me explain this with an example. Consider the system of two hard
balls moving in a box (Example 1) and an observation function of this system with four
possible values e1, e2, e3, e4. Because a probability measure p is defined on the phase space
X, one obtains probabilities such as p(Φ(Tt) = e1) and p(Φ(Ts) = e2 given that Φ(Tt) = e4)
for all t, s ∈ R. Now {Φ(Tt)} is exactly the stochastic process with outcomes e1, e2, e3, e4 and
the probability distributions determined by observing the hard ball system with Φ. Hence
the possible outcomes of {Φ(Tt)} are the possible observed values of the hard ball system;
and the realisations of {Φ(Tt)} and the solutions of the hard ball system coarse-grained
by Φ have the same probability distributions. That is, {Φ(Tt)} and the hard ball system
observed with Φ are observationally equivalent.
The question which immediately arises is whether the stochastic process {Φ(Tt)} is
nontrivial. To highlight the issue: if Φ is the identity function, {Φ(Tt)} = {Tt}; hence
this stochastic process has only trivial probabilities (0 and 1) and is really the original
deterministic system. It turns out that {Φ(Tt)} is often nontrivial. Let me state a result
proven in Werndl (2010).
Theorem 1 If for the deterministic system (X,Tt, p) there does not exist an n ∈ R+ and
a C ⊆ X, 0 < p(C) < 1, such that Tn(C) = C, then for any arbitrary nontrivial finite-
valued observation function Φ, {Zt} = {Φ(Tt)} is nontrivial in the following sense: for every
k ∈ R+ there are ei, ej ∈ E such that 0 < P (Zt+k = ei given that Zt = ej) < 1.
This result is strong because one obtains nontrivial stochastic processes regardless of
which finite-valued observation function is applied. Theorem 1 applies to several systems of
importance in science, e.g., to hard ball systems which are important in statistical mechanics;
in particular, to two hard balls moving in a box (Example 1) and to almost all systems of a
finite number of hard balls moving on a torus of arbitrary dimension (Sima´nyi 1999, Sima´nyi
2003); to geodesic flows of negative curvature, i.e., frictionless motion of a particle moving
with unit speed on a compact manifold with everywhere negative curvature (Ornstein &
Weiss 1991); to many types of billiard systems (Chernov & Markarian 2006); and also
to dissipative systems such as the Lorenz system which has been used to model weather
dynamics and waterwheels (Luzzatto, Melbourne & Paccaut 2005).
The discussion so far was about how, given deterministic systems, one finds observa-
tionally equivalent stochastic processes. There are also results about how, given stochastic
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processes, one finds observationally equivalent deterministic systems. First of all, given any
arbitrary stochastic process, one can construct a deterministic system, called the determi-
nistic representation, such that the following holds: observed with a specific observation
function Φ0 the deterministic representation is observationally equivalent to the stochas-
tic process. Yet the phase space of the deterministic representation is defined as the set
consisting of all possible realisations of the stochastic process and thus this construction
involves a cheat (see Werndl 2010). Apart from the deterministic representation, there are
results which show how, given certain kinds of stochastic processes, one finds observationally
equivalent deterministic systems (cf. Ornstein & Weiss 1991). Let me present two results in
this direction.
Theorem 1 tells us that deterministic systems in science and stochastic processes can
be observationally equivalent. Yet it is silent about the nature of these processes. So one
might wonder whether deterministic systems in science can be observationally equivalent to
stochastic processes in science (where systems and processes in science are those systems
and processes that are derived with help of scientific theories). The following theorem shows
that this is indeed the case.
Theorem 2 If the deterministic system (X,Tt, p) is a continuous Bernoulli system, then
there are observation functions Φ such that {Φ(Tt)} is a semi-Markov process (Ornstein
1970).
Several deterministic systems in science are continuous Bernoulli systems (e.g., all the sys-
tems listed after Theorem 1). Hence several deterministic systems in science yield stochastic
processes in science (namely semi-Markov processes (Example 2)).
One can go even further and ask: can deterministic systems in science only yield stochas-
tic processes in science for some specific observation functions? Or can deterministic systems
in science yield stochastic processes in science regardless at which observation level they are
observed? It turns out that the latter is true.
Theorem 3 If the deterministic system (X,Tt, p) is a continuous Bernoulli system, then for
every α > 0, (X,Tt, p) is α-congruent to a semi-Markov process (Ornstein & Weiss 1991).
Intuitively speaking, being α-congruent means to be observationally equivalent at observa-
tion level α (see Werndl 2010). As just mentioned, several deterministic systems in science
are continuous Bernoulli systems. Thus Theorem 3 shows that several deterministic systems
in science are observationally equivalent at every observation level to stochastic processes in
science (namely semi-Markov processes (see Example 2)).
Now that the results on observational equivalence have been presented, let me turn to
the mathematicians’ comments about them.
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4 Mathematicians’ Comments on Observational Equiv-
alence
Hardly any mathematicians comment on the philosophical significance or implications of
the results on observational equivalence. The main exception is the following:
Our theorem [Theorem 3] also tells us that certain semi-Markov systems could
be thought of as being produced by Newton’s laws (billiards seen through a
deterministic viewer) or by coin-flipping. This may mean that there is no philo-
sophical distinction between processes governed by roulette wheels and processes
governed by Newton’s laws. {The popular literature emphasises the distinction
between “deterministic chaos” and “real randomness”.} In this connection we
should note that our model for a stationary process (§ 1.2) [the determinis-
tic representation] means that random processes have a deterministic model.
This model, however, is abstract, and there is no reason to believe that it can
be endowed with any special additional structure. Our point is that we are
comparing, in a strong sense, Newton’s laws and coin flipping.2 (Ornstein and
Weiss 1991, 39–40)
Let me first focus on the claim that there may be no “philosophical distinction between
processes governed by roulette wheels and processes governed by Newton’s laws”. The
most direct reading of the claim is that there may be no conceptual distinction between
deterministic and stochastic descriptions. This seems wrong. This conceptual distinction
will always remain, regardless of any results on observational equivalence.
In the above quote Ornstein & Weiss (1991) also comment on the meaning Theorem 3.
On the most plausible reading, they claim that it expresses that deterministic systems in sci-
ence, when observed with specific observation functions (called “viewers”), can be observa-
tionally equivalent to stochastic processes in science (namely semi-Markov processes). This
also illuminates why Ornstein & Weiss mention the deterministic representation, namely, to
highlight that this is a case of observational equivalence different from the deterministic rep-
resentation, which is not a system is science. However, this claim is puzzling. As discussed
in the previous section, already Theorem 2 shows that deterministic systems in science can
be observationally equivalent to semi-Markov processes; and Theorem 2 was known before
Theorem 3 was proven and is weaker than Theorem 3. Still, this is the most plausible
reading (cf. Werndl 2010). In the previous section I argued that Theorem 3 shows that
deterministic systems in science are observationally equivalent at every observation level to
stochastic processes in science. So one expected Ornstein & Weiss to claim this. But this
seems not to be the case because, first, they do not refer to all possible observation levels,
and second, if they claimed this, there would be no reason to mention the deterministic
representation.
2The text in braces is in a footnote.
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Suppes (1993, 254) claims that Ornstein & Weiss (1991) prove the following (referring
to Theorem 3): “There are processes which can equally well be analysed as deterministic
systems of classical mechanics or as indeterministic semi-Markov processes, no matter how
many observations are made.” Clearly, Theorem 3 only proves some results about obser-
vational equivalence and not that processes can be equally well analysed as deterministic
and indeterministic descriptions. It is not clear that the latter follows from the former.
Indeed, as I will argue in the next section, the results on observational equivalence do not
imply that the phenomena can be equally well analysed as deterministic and indeterministic
descriptions.
To my knowledge, Winnie (1998, 310) is the only philosopher who discusses the above
quote by Ornstein & Weiss. He takes the claim that there may be no “philosophical dis-
tinction between processes governed by roulette wheels and processes governed by Newton’s
laws” to mean what Suppes (1993) claims, namely the following: the phenomena can be
equally well analysed as deterministic and indeterministic descriptions. Because it is not
clear that the absence of the philosophical distinction means the same as that the phenom-
ena are equally analysable, it is unclear whether Ornstein & Weiss (1991) want to say this.
But if they do, their claim will not be generally true. As just mentioned, I will argue in the
next section that the results on observational equivalence do not imply that the phenomena
can be equally well analysed as deterministic and indeterministic descriptions.
5 Winnie on the Role of Different Observations
Choice and Underdetermination
We have seen that, in certain cases, deterministic and stochastic descriptions are obser-
vationally equivalent. Hence there is a choice between a deterministic description and a
stochastic description obtained by applying an observation function Φ to the deterministic
description, and the question arises of which description is preferable. I will assume that the
deterministic and the stochastic description are about the same level of reality, e.g., they
both describe the motion of two hard balls in a box.3 And I will focus on the question of
which description is preferable relative to all evidence.
It is important to note that there is no underdetermination between a deterministic
system and a stochastic process obtained by applying Φ relative to all in principle possible
observations which show whether there are more states than the ones given by the observation
function Φ. Clearly, if in principle possible observations show whether there are more states
than the ones given by the observation function Φ, then only the deterministic system or
the stochastic process is in agreement with the possible observations.
3If the descriptions are about different levels of reality, the situation is quite different. For instance, in
certain cases one might argue that at one level of reality the deterministic description is preferable and at
another level of reality the stochastic description is preferable.
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However, other kinds of underdetermination are possible, namely all kinds of underde-
termination which are relative to observations which do not show whether there are more
states than the ones given by the observation function Φ. In particular, suppose that an
observation function Φ is given and that current technology does not allow one to find out
whether there are more states then the ones given by Φ (from the deterministic perspective
this means that Φ is, or is finer than, the finest possible observation function). This implies
that the predictions of the deterministic system and of the stochastic process which results
from applying Φ to the deterministic system agree at all currently possible observation levels.
If the possible evidence does not favour a description, this represents a case of underdeter-
mination relative to all currently possible observations (cf. Laudan & Leplin 1991). I take
it that Suppes’ (1993) claim that the phenomenon in question is equally well analysable by
deterministic and stochastic descriptions implies that there is underdetermination.
In what follows I will concentrate on an argument against underdetermination put for-
ward by Winnie (1998). I will criticize this argument and, in particular, I will clarify a
confusion in it.
Trivial Transition Probabilities to Coarser Observations
Winnie (1998) starts with the following thought. For a deterministic system (X,Tt, p)
consider an observation function Ψ and an observation function Φ which is coarser than Ψ,
i.e., there is at least one value of Φ such that two or more values of Ψ corresponds to one
value of Φ. Even if {Φ(Tt)} and {Ψ(Tt)} are nontrivial stochastic processes, the following can
hold for a time period t: for every value oΨ of Ψ and every value oΦ of Φ the probability that
oΨ will lead to oΦ after t time steps is 0 or 1. Thus there are trivial transition probabilities
from the observation Ψ to the coarser observation Φ, where the transition probabilities are
the probabilities that any arbitrary value follows another arbitrary value.4 Winnie (1998,
314–315) comments on this:
Thus, the fact that a chaotic deterministic system [...] has some partitioning
that yields a set of random or stochastic observations in no way undermines the
distinction between deterministic and stochastic behaviour for such systems. [...]
4Here is a mathematical example. On the unit square X = [0, 1]× [0, 1] consider
T ((x, y)) = (2x,
y
2
) if 0 ≤ x < 1
2
; (2x− 1, y + 1
2
) if
1
2
≤ x ≤ 1. (1)
For the Lebesgue probability measure p one obtains the discrete-time deterministic system (X,T, p),
called the baker’s transformation. Consider Φ((x, y)) = o1χα1((x, y)) + o2χα2((x, y)) where α1 =
[0, 1] × [0, 1/2], α2 = [0, 1] × (1/2, 1] and Ψ((x, y)) =
∑4
i=1 qiχβi((x, y)) where β1 = [0, 1/2] × [0, 1/2], β2 =
(1/2, 1]× [0, 1/2], β3 = [0, 1/2]× (1/2, 1], β4 = (1/2, 1]× (1/2, 1] (χA(x) is the characteristic function of A,
i.e., χA(x) = 1 for x ∈ A and 0 otherwise). It is clear that if one observes q1 (with Ψ), the probability that
one next observes o1 (with Φ) is 1; if one observes q2, the probability that one next observes o2 is 1; if one
observes q3, the probability that one next observes o1 is 1; and if one observes q4, the probability that one
next observes o2 is 1.
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As successive partitionings are exemplified [...] the determinism underlying the
preceding, coarser observations emerges. To be sure, at any state of the above
process, the system may be modeled stochastically, but the successive stages of
that modeling process provide ample—inductive—reason for believing that the
deterministic model is correct [original emphasis].
In order to understand this quote, note the following. From the fact that there are trivial
transition probabilities from an observation (Ψ) to a coarser observation (Φ) after t time
steps, it does not follow that the observed phenomenon is deterministic and Winnie also
does not claim this. It may well be that {Ψ(Tt)}, or any stochastic process at a smaller
scale, really governs the phenomenon under consideration.
The argument Winnie seems to make is the following. Consider the observation functions
which one can apply, some of them finer than others. Suppose that for some observation
functions there are trivial transition probabilities from finer to coarser observation functions
after t time steps for some fixed time t. Now consider all possible observation functions such
that there are trivial transition probabilities from finer to coarser observation functions, and
suppose that one finds that for finer observation functions one observes stochastic processes
at a smaller scale (i.e., processes where there is at least one outcome of the stochastic process
at a larger scale such that two or more outcomes of the stochastic process at a smaller
scale correspond to one outcome of the process at a larger scale). Then the deterministic
description is preferable relative to evidence.
My first criticism is that it is unclear why it is required in this argument that there are
trivial transition probabilities from finer to coarser observations. The force of the argument
seems only that for finer observation functions what one observes are stochastic processes
at a smaller scale and that the stochastic processes at a smaller scale explain how the
probabilities of the stochastic process at the larger scale arise. Simple examples show that
there are a set of observation functions such that finer observation functions yield stochastic
processes at a smaller scale, but the transition probabilities from finer to coarser observation
functions are not always (or even never) trivial.5 The force of the argument also seems to
apply to these examples. From the text it is not entirely clear whether Winnie thought that
trivial transition probabilities to coarser observations are decisive for the argument that
the deterministic description is preferable. If yes, as just argued, this is puzzling because
the force of the argument does not seem to hinge on this. If not, it is confusing that
trivial transition probabilities to coarser observations are highlighted in his argument for
the deterministic description.
I will now criticize Winnie’s argument and my criticism will apply regardless of whether
or not one requires that the observation functions are such that trivial transition probabilities
5Here is a mathematical example. Consider the baker’s transformation (X,T, p). Let Ψ((x, y)) =∑4
i=1 qiχβi((x, y)) be as in the previous footnote, and consider Φ((x, y)) = o1χγ1((x, y)) + o2χγ2((x, y))
where γ1 = [0, 1/2] × [0, 1], γ2 = (1/2, 1] × [0, 1]. Clearly, for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, and all j, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, the
probability that qi is followed by oj is 1/2. Still Φ is coarser that Ψ, and for the observation Ψ at the finer
level one obtains a stochastic process at a smaller scale.
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are observed from finer to coarser observations.
Criticism of Winnie’s Argument About Finer Stochastic Processes
Winnie does not state which kind of underdetermination he is concerned with. Suppose that
it is underdetermination relative to in principle possible observations which show whether
there are more states than the ones given by the observation function Φ. As argued at
the beginning of this section, here it is trivial that there is no underdetermination. As-
sume that the phenomenon of concern is deterministic. Then Winnie’s argument indeed
establishes that the deterministic description is preferable because the following holds only
for the deterministic description: when considering all possible observation functions (and,
maybe, select only those possible observation functions such that there are trivial transition
probabilities from finer to coarser observations), then finer observation functions lead to
stochastic processes at a smaller scale. This is so because there will be no finest observa-
tion function and hence only the deterministic descriptions will be in agreement with the
observations. Still, Winnie’s argument seems unnecessary in the sense that the reason why
there is no underdetermination is simply that only the deterministic description agrees with
the in principle possible observations.
Suppose Winnie is concerned with underdetermination relative to all possible observa-
tions given current technology. I will argue that in this case Winnie’s argument fails. To
criticise Winnie’s argument, it will suffice to present a scenario that could happen in sci-
ence (regardless of whether this is actually the case) where the premises of the argument
are true but the conclusion is not. Let me outline such a scenario (for more details, see
Werndl 2009b).
This scenario appeals to indirect evidence, which is generally regarded as an important
kind of evidence (Laudan 1995, Laudan & Leplin 1991, Okasha 1998, Okasha 2002). Let me
given an example of indirect evidence (cf. Laudan 1995). Galileo’s law of free fall is only
about the motion of bodies near the Earth’s surface, while Kepler’s law is only about the
motion of planets. Galileo’s and Kelper’s law are derivable from Newtonian theory (under
certain assumptions). This means that predictions derived from Galileo’s law which are in
agreement with the observations can provide evidence for Kelper’s law, even though this
evidence is not derivable from Kepler’s law (and hence constitutes indirect evidence for
Kelper’s law). As Laudan & Leplin (1991) point out, indirect evidence can be an argument
against underdetermination. Suppose the same predictions are derivable from a hypothesis
H than from Kepler’s law but that H is not derivable from Newtonian theory. Because of
the indirect evidence for Kepler’s law, Kelper’s law is preferable to H relative to evidence,
and there is no underdetermination.
An analogous argument for our concern—descriptions and not hypotheses—can easily
be found. Suppose that the stochastic description S which arises from applying Φ to the
deterministic system derives from a well-confirmed theory W and the deterministic descrip-
tion D does not derive from any theory. Furthermore, suppose that current technology
11
does not allow one to find out whether there are more states than the ones given by Φ.
Then for the observation functions which one can apply (and where, maybe, only those
possible observation functions are considered where there are trivial transition probabilities
from finer to coarser observations) the following holds: for finer observations one observes
stochastic processes at a smaller scale; hence the premises of Winnie’s argument are true.
Even though S and D are observationally equivalent, there are many descriptions which
are not derivable from S or D but which support W . Now suppose that some of these
descriptions provide indirect evidence for S. Then the stochastic description S is preferable
relative to evidence, and the conclusion of Winnie’s argument is not true. Furthermore,
there is no underdetermination. Consequently, Suppes’s (1993) claim that the phenomena
are equally well analysable as deterministic and stochastic descriptions fails.
Regardless of what exactly indirect evidence amounts to, the above argument shows that
Winnie’s argument fails. Note that being derivable from the same hypothesis or statement
cannot be sufficient for indirect evidence because this would lead to the paradox that any
statement confirms any statement (Okasha 1998).6 A promising account is that there is
indirect confirmation when two statements are strongly coherent because of a unifying the-
ory; in our examples Galileo’s law and Kepler’s law strongly cohere because of the unifying
power of Newtonian theory, and S and the other descriptions strongly cohere because of the
unifying power of W .
6 Conclusion
This paper started by presenting, in an intuitive manner, some recent results on the observa-
tional equivalence of deterministic and indeterministic descriptions. After that philosophical
questions prompted by these results were examined.
First, I discussed the philosophical comments made by mathematicians about observa-
tional equivalence, namely Ornstein & Weiss (1991), and I argued that they are misguided.
For instance, on a direct reading, Ornstein & Weiss claim that the results on observational
equivalence may show that there is no conceptual distinction between deterministic and in-
deterministic descriptions. However, regardless of any results on observational equivalence,
this distinction will always remain.
Second, if there is a choice between a deterministic and an indeterministic description,
the question arises of which description is preferable. I investigated Winnie’s (1998) argu-
ment that the deterministic description is preferable which goes as follows. Consider the
possible observation functions which one can apply and which are such that there are trivial
transition probabilities from finer to coarser observations after t time steps. Suppose that
stochastic processes at a smaller scale are observed when finer observation functions are
applied. Then the deterministic description is preferable relative to all evidence. I clarified
6Statement A confirms itself; A is derivable from A ∧ B where B is any statement; B is derivable from
A ∧B. Hence, A confirms B.
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a confusion in this argument: it unclear why trivial transition probabilities are required
from finer to coarser observations because the force of the argument does not seem to hinge
on this. Then I argued that, regardless of this confusion, if the concern is a strong form
of underdetermination, the argument delivers the desired conclusion but this conclusion is
trivial. And if the concern is underdetermination relative to the possible observations given
current technology, the argument fails. The question of whether the deterministic or the
stochastic process is preferable is an interesting one and, as my discussion has hopefully
shown, it deserves further investigation.
Acknowledgements
I am indebted to Jeremy Butterfield for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also
grateful for valuable suggestions and stimulating discussions to Franz Huber, James Lady-
man, Thomas Mu¨ller, Miklo´s Re´dei, Jos Uffink, and the audiences at the Oxford Philosophy
of Physics Research Seminar, the Bristol Philosophy and History of Science Research Semi-
nar, and the EPSA 2009. This research has been supported by a Junior Research Fellowship
from the Queen’s College, Oxford University, and a Benefactors’ Scholarship from St John’s
College, Cambridge University.
References
Butterfield, J. (2005), ‘Determinism and indeterminism’. Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philo-
sophy Online.
Chernov, N. & Markarian, R. (2006), Chaotic Billiards, American Mathematical Society,
Providence.
Janssen, J. & Limnios, N. (1999), Semi-Markov Models and Applications, Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Dordrecht, the Netherlands.
Laudan, L. (1995), ‘Damn the consequences!’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association 69, 27–34.
Laudan, L. & Leplin, J. (1991), ‘Empirical equivalence and underdetermination’, The Jour-
nal of Philosophy 88, 449–472.
Luzzatto, S., Melbourne, I. & Paccaut, F. (2005), ‘The Lorenz attractor is mixing’, Com-
munications in Mathematical Physics 260, 393–401.
Okasha, S. (1998), ‘Laudan and Leplin on empirical equivalence’, The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 48, 251–256.
13
Okasha, S. (2002), ‘Underdetermination, holism and the theory/data distinction’, The Philo-
sophical Quarterly 208, 303–319.
Ornstein, D. (1970), Imbedding Bernoulli shifts in flows, in A. Dold & B. Eckmann, eds,
‘Contributions to Ergodic Theory and Probability, Proceedings of the First Midwestern
Conference on Ergodic Theory held at the Ohio State University, March 27-30’, Lecture
Notes in Mathematics, vol. 160, Springer, Berlin, pp. 178–218.
Ornstein, D. & Weiss, B. (1991), ‘Statistical properties of chaotic systems’, Bulletin of the
American Mathematical Society 24, 11–116.
Sima´nyi, N. (1999), ‘Ergodicity of hard spheres in a box’, Ergodic Theory and Dynamical
Systems 19, 741–766.
Sima´nyi, N. (2003), ‘Proof of the Boltzmann-Sinai ergodic hypothesis for typical hard disk
systems’, Inventiones Mathematicae 154, 123–178.
Suppes, P. (1993), ‘The transcendental character of determinism’, Midwest Studies in Philo-
sophy 18, 242–257.
Werndl, C. (2009a), ‘Are deterministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions obser-
vationally equivalent?’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40, 232–
242.
Werndl, C. (2009b), Philosophical Aspects of Chaos: Definitions in Mathematics, Under-
determination and the Observational Equivalence of Deterministic and Indeterministic
Desriptions, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, Cambridge.
Werndl, C. (2010), ‘A hierarchy of observational equivalence of continuous-time determinis-
tic and indeterministic descriptions’, Unpublished .
Winnie, J. (1998), Deterministic chaos and the nature of chance, in J. Earman & J. Norton,
eds, ‘The Cosmos of Science – Essays of Exploration’, Pittsburgh University Press,
Pittsburgh, pp. 299–324.
14
